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Abstract. The research devoted to design and implementation of new knowledge-
based methods and tools for verification and validation of complex software 
systems is now an important direction of scientific investigations. The paper 
describes the approach and software environment developed for agent-based 
modeling and simulation of defense against coordinated distributed attacks in the 
Internet. According to this approach, the cybernetic opposition of malefactors and 
defense systems in the Internet is represented by competition of antagonistic 
softbots’ teams. The possibility of the approach application is analyzed by testing 
the defense mechanisms against Distribute Denial of Service attacks.  
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Introduction  
Nowadays one of very important research directions is connected with development of 
new knowledge-based methods and tools for comprehensive investigation of complex 
systems (including testing, verification and validation of software components). It is 
especially true for the systems which operate in distributed competitive noisy 
environments, where the large groups of various defense and offense components 
counteract and collaborate (for example, in such domains as information warfare, 
competition in business, computer network assurance, etc.).  
One of the solutions of this problem can be based on the investigative modeling and 
simulation using the family of various approaches (system dynamics, discrete-event 
and agent-based simulation, etc.) and different models (from analytical to scaled-down 
and full-scale). The choice of specific approaches and models depends on the goals of 
investigation, the complexity of subject domain, and the necessary fidelity and 
scalability of models. Our interest is related to the competition processes taking place 
in the Internet consisting in interaction of large number of cooperating and antagonistic 
software agents or softbots. Analytical models let imitate global processes (including 
viral epidemic), but describe the ones only on the abstract level. Packet-level 
simulation of network processes gives the opportunities to improve the fidelity of 
simulation, and can represent attack and defense actions as packet exchange. Those 
models can precisely specify these actions on the data link, network, transport and 
application layers. The greatest fidelity is archived with hardware testbeds. But these 
testbeds succeed in simulation of sufficiently limited fragments of interactions.  
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simulation of competition processes in the Internet elaborated by authors. We suggest 
using this approach for investigation of distributed defense mechanisms which can be 
deployed in the Internet for protection from distributed coordinated network attacks. 
The possibility of the approach application is analyzed by testing the defense 
mechanisms against one of the most dangerous classes of network attacks – DDoS 
(Distribute Denial of Service) [22]. According to the approach suggested, the 
cybernetic counteraction of “bad guys” and security systems is represented by the 
interaction of different softbots’ teams. The aggregated system behavior becomes 
apparent by means of the local interactions of particular softbots in dynamic 
environment that is defined by the model of computer network. We distinguish at least 
the team of malefactors and the defense team. The softbots from the same team 
collaborate to achieve the joint intention (to realize the threat or to defense the network).  
The main basis for the research is the agent teamwork theory. There are three well-
known approaches to the formalization of the agent teamwork – joint intentions theory 
[5], shared plans theory [12] and the hybrid approaches [14, 26] which use the 
combination of joint intentions and shared plans theories. A lot of teamwork 
approaches are implemented in various multi-agent software, e.g. GRATE*, OAA, 
CAST, RETSINA-MAS, COGNET/BATON, Team-Soar, etc.  
Another fundamental component of the research is represented by the studies on 
reasoning systems about opponent intentions and plans on the basis of current situation 
estimation [3, 16, 29, 30]. There were published the studies on determining the 
malefactor’s plans during the intrusion detection [8, 10]. It is proposed to use the ideas 
of agent plans recognition on the basis of stochastic formal grammar recovery 
algorithms [11]. The important components in this research are the methods of 
reflexive processes theory [20], game theory [25] and control in conflict situations [6]. 
Authors used the methods of agent actions scenario specification based on the 
stochastic attributive formal grammars [11]. They correlated with colonies of 
cooperative distributed grammars and grammar models of multi-agent systems [17]. As 
teams are to adapt to reconfiguration, traffic changes and new types of defense and 
attacks on the basis of past experience it is important to take into account the present 
studies in the area of adaptation and self-learning [1, 13].  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Sections 1 and 2 outline suggested 
approach for modeling and simulation. Section 3 describes the software environment 
developed for simulation. Section 4 presents one of simulation scenarios fulfilled. 
Conclusion outlines the main results of the paper and future work directions.  
1. Modeling and Simulation Approach  
It is assumed the competing softbots gather information from different sources, 
operate with fuzzy (or probabilistic) knowledge, forecast the intentions and actions of 
opponent, estimate the possible risks and try to deceive each other, and react on 
opponent’s actions. The choice of behavior for each team depends on the chosen goal 
of functioning. The choice of every step of a team behavior is defined dynamically 
depending on the opposite team actions and the state of environment.  
Each team acts in the conditions of limited information. Every team member might 
have different information about actions done by other team members. Therefore the 
model of behavior must be able to represent the incompleteness of information and the possibility of accidental factors. The softbots are to foresee, what each softbot knows, 
what task has to be solved and to which one it must address its request if it is outside of 
its competence. The messages of one softbot are to be represented in such terms that 
are understandable by others.  
The use of ontologies is the one of the most perspective approaches to structure the 
distributed knowledge. As for every application domain the information security 
ontology represents the partially normalized set of notions that are to be used by other 
softbots. Besides the relation of partial order the nodes of this structure have other 
relations peculiar to the application domain. The ontology defines the subset of notions, 
that various softbots use to solve tasks stated. Each softbot uses a fragment of 
application ontology. Each softbot specialization is represented by a subset of ontology 
nodes. Some of nodes can be shared by several softbots. Usually only one of them has 
the detailed description of a node. This softbot is the owner of the corresponding 
fragment of knowledge base. At the same time some part of ontological knowledge 
base is shared for all team. This part is the fragment that is to be the shared context.  
The team of malefactors evolves with the aid of generation of new instances and 
types of attacks and attack scenarios. The defense team adapts by changing the security 
policy, forming new instances of defense methods and security profiles.  
The softbots’ counteraction model includes: (1) Ontology of application domain 
containing application notions and relations between them; (2) protocols of teamwork 
(for malefactors’ and defense team); (3) Models of individual, group and team 
behavior; (4) Communication component for message exchange; (5) Models of 
environment (computer network), including topological and functional components.  
The approach for teamwork proposed in the paper is based on the joint use of the 
elements of joint intentions theory, shared plans theory and hybrid approach. The 
teamwork is assumed to be organized due to the shared (group) plan of actions [19]. 
The structure of team is described in terms of group and individual roles hierarchy. The 
leaves of hierarchy correspond to the roles of individual softbots, the intermediate 
nodes – to the group roles. The specification of action plans hierarchy is made for every 
role. The following elements are defined for every plan: initial conditions, when the 
plan is offered for fulfillment; the conditions with which the plan stops being fulfilled; 
actions executed on the team level as the part of the shared plan. The joint activity is 
obviously expressed for the group plans. Softbots can create the “snapshots” of mental 
state of the whole team due to forming of joint intentions on the different abstract 
levels. The mechanisms of softbot interaction and coordination are based on the three 
groups of procedures [26, 19]: (1) the providing acts consistency; (2) softbots’ 
functionality monitoring and recovery; and (3) communication selectivity support (to 
choose the most “useful” communication acts).  
2. Attacks and Defense Softbots  
The idea of DDoS attack consists in reaching the global goal – the denial of service of 
some resource – due to joint efforts of many components that are acting on attack side. 
In that way the initial goal is divided into more simple sub-goals. They are given to 
particular softbots. At the same time the goal on the top level stays shared between 
softbots. On the low level, the local goals are formed. Their achievement is targeted on 
solving the shared task. The softbots interact with each other to coordinate local 
solutions. This is necessary to reach the shared goal “denial of service”.  Generally, the components of attack system are the programs which have the 
following features: autonomy; initial knowledge about itself, interacting entities and 
environment; knowledge (or hard-coded algorithm) that allows to process the external 
data from environment; the presence of a goal and a list of actions to reach this goal; 
the communication and interaction mechanisms (protocols) to reach the shared goal.  
Analyzing the present methods of DDoS realization it is possible to determine at 
least two types of attack softbots: “Daemon” – it executes the attack directly; “Master” 
– it coordinates the actions of other system components. So the attack team is a two-
level system. Masters act on the higher level directly fulfilling the malefactor’s tasks. 
They make decisions: when to start the attack, what target to attack, what is the attack 
intensity. Masters coordinate daemons’ actions by sending commands. Daemons act on 
lower level. After receiving the messages from masters, they start or finish sending the 
attack packets or change the attack intensity.  
On the preliminary stage the master and daemons are deployed on available 
(compromised) hosts in the Internet. Then the attack team is established: daemons send 
to master the messages saying they are alive and ready to work. Master stores the 
information about team members and their state. The malefactor sets the common goal 
of team – to perform DDoS attack. Master receives attack parameters. Its goal is to 
distribute these parameters among all available daemons. Then daemons act. Their 
local goal is to execute the master command. To fulfill attack they send the attack 
packets to the given host. After this it is believed that the goal is reached. Master asks 
daemons periodically to find out that they are alive and ready to work. Receiving the 
messages from daemons the master manages the given rate of attack. If there is no any 
message from one of the daemons the master makes the decision to change the attack 
parameters. For example, it can send to some or all daemons the commands to change 
the attack rate. Daemons can execute the attack in various modes. This feature affects 
on the potentialities of defense team. Daemons can use different types of attacks, send 
attack packets with various rates, spoof source IP address and do it with various rates. 
Malefactor can stop the attack by sending to master the command “stop the attack”. 
Then master distributes this command among all daemons, and they stop the attack.  
The main task of defense systems against DDoS is to accurately detect attacks and 
quickly respond to them [31]. It is equally important to recognize the legitimate traffic 
that shares the attack signature and deliver it reliably to the victim [21]. Traditional 
defense include detection and reaction mechanisms. Different network characteristics 
are used for detection of malicious actions (for example, source IP address [24], traffic 
volume [9], and packet content [23]). To detect abnormal network characteristics, many 
methods can be applied (for instance, statistical, cumulative sum, pattern matching, etc). 
As a rule, the reaction mechanisms include filtering, congestion control and traceback. 
But, as a result of several reasons (detection of DDoS attack is most accurate close to 
the victim, separation of legitimate is most successful close to the sources, etc.), 
adequate victim protection to constrain attack traffic can only be achieved by 
cooperation of different distributed components [21]. So, the DDoS problem requires a 
distributed cooperative solution [2, 4, 23, 18, 32, 31, 21, etc.].  
The analysis of present DDoS defense systems shows the following their features: 
The defense systems are built of basic components which have some local meaning but 
serve together for common shared goal; The number and functionality of defense 
system components depend on the place of their deployment; As a rule, the defense 
systems have a hierarchical structure, where different levels serve for particular sub-
tasks of the complex defense goal. The general approach to the DDoS defense is the following. The information about normal traffic is collected from different network 
sensors. Then the analyzer-component compares in real-time the current traffic with the 
normal traffic. The system tries to trace back the source of anomalies (due to 
“traceback” mechanisms) and generates the recommendations how to cut off them or 
how to lower the quantity of these anomalies. Depending on security administrator’s 
choice, the system applies some countermeasure. We set the following defense softbot 
classes: “Sensor” – for initial information processing; “Sampler” – the network data 
collector that forms the traffic model; “Detector” – for attack detection; “Filter” – for 
attack traffic filtering; “Investigator” – for attack investigation. Sensor  processes 
information about network packets and collects statistic data on traffic for defended 
host. Sensor determines the size of overall traffic (BPS – bit per seconds) and the 
addresses of n hosts that make the greatest traffic (in developed prototype – all hosts). 
Its local goal is to give these parameters to detector every k seconds. Samplers are 
deployed in the defended subnet to collect the data on its normal functioning. Using 
this data they can detect anomalies. The examples of methods which can be realized by 
sampler are Hop counts Filtering (HCF) [15], Source IP address monitoring (SIPM) 
[28], Bit per Second (BPS), etc. Detector local goal is to make the decision if the attack 
happens. It sends its decision and N addresses to filter and to investigator. Filter local 
goal is to filter the traffic on the basis of data from detector. If it was determined that 
the network is under attack, filter begins to filter the packets from the given hosts. The 
goal of investigator is to identify and defeat the attack softbots. When investigator 
receives the message from detector it examines the given addresses on the presence of 
attack softbots and tries to defeat identified softbots.  
3. Simulation Environment  
The simulation environment architecture consists of the following components (Fig.1): 
OMNeT++ Framework, INET Framework, Multi-agent & DDoS Framework. Agent-
based simulation is implemented in Multi-agent Framework that uses the library of 
attack and defense mechanisms called DoS Framework. INET Framework is used to 
simulate the IP nodes. It is an OMNeT++ model itself.  
OMNeT++ Framework [27] is a discrete event simulator. Its primary application 
area is the simulation of computer networks and other distributed systems. Simulation 
models are composed of hierarchically nested modules that interact due to message 
passing (Fig.1, OMNeT++ Framework: simulation model & component library). 
Module functionality is programmed using C++, while the model structure is defined 
by the special topology description language. INET Framework and Multi-agent DDoS 
Framework are the OMNeT++ models. The exchange of messages between modules 
happens due to channels (modules are connected with them by the gates) or directly by 
gates. A gate can be incoming or outgoing to receive or to send messages accordingly. 
Channel is characterized by propagation delay, bit error rate and transmission data rate.  
OMNeT++ INET Framework is the OMNeT++ modular simulation suite with a 
realistic simulation of Internet nodes and protocols. The highest IP simulation 
abstraction level is the network itself, consists of IP nodes. IP node can represent router 
or host. IP node in INET Framework corresponds to the computer representation of 
Internet Protocol (Fig.1, INET Framework). Multi-agent & DDoS Framework is the 
INET Framework modular suite aimed to simulate the DDoS attack and defense 
mechanisms on the basis of team counteraction (Fig.1, Multi-agent DDoS Framework).  
Figure 1. Simulation environment architecture  
DDoS Framework suite consists of DDoS attack and defense modules (Fig.1, 
Attack module, Defense module) and the modules that expand IP node from INET: the 
filtering table and the packet analyzer. Attack and defense modules are the applications 
and are deployed on the network layer of IP node. To set the DDoS attack conditions it 
is necessary to define the corresponding input parameters, including victim type (host), 
attack rate dynamics (function of attack packets sending rate), spoofing technique (no 
spoofing, random, subnet), etc. Also one need to set up the defense parameters, 
including deployment location (defended, intermediate, source subnet), detection 
technique, model data gathering technique and its parameters (time interval and time 
shift of data collection), etc. The examples of output parameters used to estimate the 
defense are as follows: Time of attack detection; Time of attack reaction (time from 
detection to counteraction); Percent of false positives; Percent of false negatives; 
Percent of normal traffic filtration; Computational complexity, etc.  
Agent Framework consists of modules representing softbots implemented as 
applications. There were used the elements of abstract FIPA architecture [7] during 
softbot modules design and implementation. Agent communication language is 
implemented for softbot interactions. The message passing happens above the TCP 
protocol (transport layer). Softbot can control the other modules (including DDoS 
Framework modules) due to messages. Softbots are deployed on the hosts in the 
simulation environment. Their installation is fulfilled by connecting to the modules 
serving transport and network layers of protocol stack simulated in INET Framework.  
The example of multi-window user interface of the simulation environment is 
depicted in Fig.2. The window for simulation management (at the bottom of Fig.2, at 
right) allows looking through and changing simulation parameters. It is important that 
you can see the events which are very valuable for understanding attack and defense 
mechanisms on time scale. Corresponding status windows (on top of Fig.2, in the 
middle and at left) show the current status of teams. It is possible to open different 
windows which characterize functioning of particular hosts, protocols and softbots, for 
example, at the bottom left of Fig.2, the window of one of the hosts is displayed.   
 
Figure 2. Common representation of simulation environment  
At the basic window of visualization (Fig.2, at upper right), a simulated computer 
network is displayed. The network represents a set of hosts and channels. Hosts can 
fulfill different functionality depending on their parameters or a set of internal modules. 
The routers are labeled with the sign “ ”. Attack softbots are deployed on the hosts 
marked with red color. Defense softbots are located on the hosts marked with green 
color. Above the colored hosts there are the strings that indicate the corresponding state 
of deployed softbots. The other hosts are the standard hosts that generate generic traffic.  
Each network for simulation consists of three sub-networks:  (1) the subnet of 
defense where the defense team is deployed;  (2) the intermediate subnet where the 
standard hosts are deployed. They produce the generic traffic in the network including 
the traffic to defended host;  (3) the subnet of attack where the attack team is deployed.  
4. Simulation Example  
Learning mode. The main task of learning mode is to create the model of generic 
traffic. The clients send the requests to the server and it replies. At this time sampler 
analyses requests and uses them to form the models and parameters. Fig.3 depicts the 
change of new addresses amount for sampler during first 300 seconds of learning. Fig.4 
represents the graph of change of maximum BPS (for interval 10 seconds and shift 3 
seconds) after 300 seconds from the beginning of learning.  
Decision making and acting. Simulation scenario is realized on the same 
configuration as was used during learning. The only difference – the attack team is 
engaged. Attack initial parameters are as follows: target of attack is server d_srv; 
intensity of attack – 5 packets per sec); no IP spoofing is used.  
  
 
 
Figure 3. Change of new IP addresses amount  Figure 4. Change of BPS parameter 
 
Fig.5 represents the graphs of channel throughput (bits/s to sec) on the entrance to 
the defended network before (red) and after (blue) filter. After simulation start the 
clients begin to send requests to the server and it replies. This is the way the generation 
of generic network traffic takes place (Fig.5, interval 0 – 300 sec). After establishing 
the defense team begins to function. Sampler collects traffic data and compares it with 
the model data that it acquired during learning mode. The addresses that are the source 
of anomalies are sent to detector. Detector makes the decision about the attack and 
sends to filter and investigator the addresses of suspicious hosts.  
After 300 sec from simulation start the attack team begins attack actions. When 
daemons receive the attack command they begin to send the attack packets (Fig.5, 
timestamp 300 sec). After a while, sampler determines the suspicious hosts with the use 
of BPS method. The BPS parameter of these hosts exceeds normal. Detector receives 
the addresses of these hosts from sampler and sends them to filter and investigator. 
Filter sets the filtering rules and the packets from the given hosts begin being dropped 
(Fig.5, timestamps 400 – 600 seconds, blue graph). 
Investigator tries to inspect the given hosts and to defeat the attack softbots 
deployed there. It succeeds in defeating of 4 daemons. However the other daemons 
continue the attack (Fig.5, after 400 seconds, red graph). Master makes the decision to 
redistribute the intensity of attack to keep the overall intensity on the given level. Also 
it decides to change the method of IP spoofing to complicate the detection and 
defeating of attack softbots by defense team. Master sends to alive daemons the 
command: target – d_srv, target port – 2001, intensity – 5/(10–4)=0.83, IP spoofing 
method – “random”. When daemons receive the command they continue to send the 
attack packets having applied the new parameters (Fig.5, timestamp 600 sec). 
Detector sees that the input channel throughput has noticeably lowered since the 
traffic from attack team has raised (Fig.5, after 600 sec). Detector does not receive the 
anomaly report from sampler though. This is because the method BPS used by sampler 
does not work fine when attacker changes the sender address in every packet. That is 
the reason detector fails to confront some address with the big traffic. Therefore 
detector decides to apply another DDoS defense method – SIPM. The large amount of 
new IP addresses for sampler will lead to attack detection and dropping of malicious 
packets. This method however does not allow tracing the source of attack and 
investigator will fail to defeat attack softbots. But the attack packets will be filtered and 
the traffic in the subnet of defended host will return to normal state.   
5. Conclusion  
The main results of the paper consist in developing a new agent-based approach for 
comprehensive investigation of defense mechanisms against distributed coordinated 
attacks in the Internet and implementing the software environment (written in C++ and 
OMNeT++) intended for simulation of DDoS attacks. We tried to model and simulate 
counteraction between malefactors and defense systems in the Internet as competition 
between teams of softbots. The main attention was drawn to the application of packet-
based imitation of softbots’ interaction which provides the acceptable fidelity and 
scalability of computer attack and defense mechanisms representation. The goal of the 
paper is not to present an investigation of new defense methods, but to show the 
possibilities of the approach suggested and the knowledge-based simulation tool 
developed. One of the features of this tool is the possibility to insert new attack and 
defense methods and investigate them. So the approach suggested and the environment 
implemented can be extended for investigation of other classes of attacks.  
The approach was examined on the example of “Distributed Denial of Service” 
attacks and defense simulation. We considered different phases of operations of 
antagonistic softbots’ teams – learning, decision making and counteracting, including 
adaptation of one team to the actions of opposite team. Various experiments with this 
environment have been fulfilled. These experiments include the investigation of attack 
scenarios and protection mechanisms for the networks with different structures and 
security policies. One of the scenarios was demonstrated in the paper.  
Future work is connected with developing an expressive formal framework for 
specification of softbots’ competition and collaboration in the Internet, building a more 
powerful simulation environment, investigating new defense mechanisms, and 
conducting experiments to both evaluate new large-scale network defense mechanisms 
and analyze the efficiency and effectiveness of different security policies which can be 
implemented for practical security solutions in the Internet.  
This research is being supported by grant of Russian Foundation of Basic Research 
(№ 04-01-00167), grant of the Department for Informational Technologies and 
Computation Systems of the Russian Academy of Sciences (contract №3.2/03) and 
partly funded by the EC as part of the POSITIF project (contract IST-2002-002314).  
Figure 5. Graphs of channel throughput 
200 400 600
5000
10000References  
[1]  T.Back, D.B.Fogel, Z.Michalewicz, Evolutionary computation. Vol. 1. Basic algorithms and operators, 
Institute of Physics Publishing. (2000). 
[2]  R.Canonico, D.Cotroneo, L.Peluso, S.P.Romano, G.Ventre, Programming routers to improve network 
security. Proceedings of the OPENSIG Workshop. (2001).  
[3]  E.Charniak, R.P.Goldman, A Bayesian Model of Plan recognition. Artificial Intelligence, V.64, N 1. 
(1993). 
[4]  S.Chen, Q.Song, Perimeter-Based Defense against High Bandwidth DDoS Attacks. IEEE Transactions 
on Parallel and Distributed Systems, Vol.16, No.7. (2005).  
[5]  P.R.Cohen, H.J.Levesque, Teamwork. Nous, Vol.25, No.4. (1991). 
[6]  V.V.Druzhinin, D.S.Kontorov, M.D.Kontorov, Introduction into conflict theory. Moscow, Radio i 
svyas’ (1989) (in Russian).  
[7] FIPA.  http://www.fipa.org 
[8]  C.W.Geib, R.P.Goldman, Plan recognition in intrusion detection systems. DARPA Information 
Survivability Conference and Exposition, DARPA and the IEEE Computer Society. (2001).  
[9]  T.M.Gil, M.Poletto, MULTOPS: a data-structure for bandwidth attack detection. Proceedings of 10th 
Usenix Security Symposium. (2001).  
[10] R.P.Goldman, C.W.Geib, C.A.Miller, A New Model of Plan Recognition. Proceedings of the 1999 
Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence. (1999).  
[11]  V.Gorodetski, I. Kotenko, Attacks against Computer Network: Formal Grammar-based Framework and 
Simulation Tool. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, V.2516. (2002).  
[12] B.Grosz, S.Kraus, Collaborative plans for complex group actions. Artificial Intelligence, Vol.86. (1996). 
[13] D.Gu, E.Yang, Multiagent Reinforcement Learning for Multi-Robot Systems: A Survey, Technical 
Report of the Department of Computer Science, University of Essex, CSM-404. (2004).  
[14] N.R.Jennings, Controlling cooperative problem solving in industrial multi-agent systems using joint 
intentions. Artificial Intelligence, Vol.75, No.2. (1995).  
[15] C.Jin, H.Wang, K.G.Shin, Hop-count filtering: An effective defense against spoofed DDoS traffic. 
Proceedings of the 10th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security. (2003). 
[16] H. Kautz, J.F.Allen, Generalized plan recognition. Proceedings of the Fifth National Conference on 
Artificial Intelligence. (1986).  
[17]  J.Kelemen, Colonies: grammars of reactive systems. Proceedings of AICRS'97. (1997).  
[18]  A.D.Keromytis, V.Misra, D.Rubenstein, SOS: An architecture for mitigating DDoS attacks. Journal on 
Selected Areas in Communications, Vol. 21. (2003).  
[19] I.Kotenko, A.Ulanov, Multiagent modeling and simulation of agents’ competition for network 
resources availability. Second International Workshop on Safety and Security in Multiagent Systems, 
Utrecht, The Netherlands. (2005).  
[20] V.A.Lefevre,  Reflexion. Moscow, “Kognito-Center” (2003) (in Russian).  
[21] J.Mirkovic, M.Robinson, P.Reiher, G.Oikonomou, Distributed Defense Against DDOS Attacks. 
University of Delaware. CIS Department. Technical Report CIS-TR-2005-02. (2005).  
[22] J.Mirkovic, S.Dietrich, D.Dittrich, P.Reiher, Internet Denial of Service: Attack and Defense 
Mechanisms. Prentice Hall PTR. (2004).  
[23]  C.Papadopoulos, R.Lindell, I.Mehringer, A.Hussain, R.Govindan, Cossack: Coordinated 
suppression of simultaneous attacks. Proceedings of DISCEX III. (2003).  
[24] T.Peng,  L.Christopher,  R.Kotagiri, Protection from Distributed Denial of Service Attack Using History-
based IP Filtering. IEEE International Conference on Communications. (2003).  
[25]  A.A. Stogniy, A.I. Kondrat’ev Game theory information modeling in decision making systems. Kiev: 
Naukova dumka. (1986) (in Russian). 
[26]  M.Tambe, Towards flexible teamwork. Journal of AI Research, Vol.7. (1997). 
[27] OMNeT++  homepage.  http://www.omnetpp.org/ 
[28] T. Peng, C. Leckie, and R. Kotagiri, Proactively Detecting DDoS Attack Using Source IP Address 
Monitoring, Networking 2004, Athens, Greece. (2004). 
[29] M.Vilain, Getting Serious about Parsing Plans: A Grammatical Analysis of Plan Recognition. 
Proceedings of the Eighth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Cambridge, MA. (1990).  
[30] M.P.Wellman,  D.V.Pynadath,  Plan Recognition under Uncertainty, Unpublished web page. (1997). 
[31] Y.Xiang, W.Zhou, An Active Distributed Defense System to Protect Web Applications from DDoS 
Attacks. The Sixth International Conference on Information Integration and Web Based Application & 
Services. (2004).  
[32]  D.Xuan, R.Bettati, W.Zhao, A gateway-based defense system for distributed dos attacks in high-speed 
networks. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics. (2002).  